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1. Introduction 
For those concerned with the complex issues of international responsibility arising from 
peace support operations established under the auspices of the United Nations, the summer 
of 2011 was an eventful season. In June, only two years after they were approved on first 
reading, the Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations were adopted by the 
International Law Commission on second reading.
2
 In July, a Dutch Court of Appeal decided 
that the conduct of the Dutch battalion of UNPROFOR (Dutchbat) in Srebrenica in 1995 
could be attributed to the Netherlands under international law, irrespective of whether the UN 
could also be deemed responsible.
3
 In August, the (then) Libyan Government asked the UN 
Secretary General to investigate alleged civilian deaths arising from NATO bombings during 
the military operation authorized by the Security Council –more proof, if any was needed, 
that international efforts for the maintenance of peace and security remain controversial and 
                                                 
1  Dott. giur. (Catania); LL.M., PhD candidate (Cambridge); Lecturer in Law, Kent Law School (Canterbury), 
F.Messineo@kent.ac.uk. This paper is partly based on my doctoral research conducted under the thoughtful supervision of 
Professor Christine Gray. Many thanks to Robin McCaig, Marko Milanović, Federica Paddeu, and Brian Sloan for providing 
useful comments on an earlier draft of this article. I am also indebted to Professor James Crawford; I should disclose here 
that I was his research assistant in June-September 2007 while he was inter alia acting as Senior Counsel for the Interveners 
(Justice and Liberty) before the House of Lords in Al-Jedda. My own involvement in the case was minimal. All URLs were 
last accessed on 1st November 2011. 
2  See A/64/10 (2009); A/CN.4/L.778 (2011). 




that questions of accountability of the United Nations and of member states authorized to use 
force by the Security Council are more and more pressing.
4
  
July also saw a decision the historical importance of which should not be 
underestimated. The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held 
in Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom that the UK was responsible for the misconduct of its troops 
deployed as part of the UN-authorized Multinational Force in Iraq.
5
 Together with two other 
recent cases, Al-Saadoon and Al-Skeini,
6
 this may be the start of a trend in the ECtHR 
directed at clarifying and expanding the scope of the European Convention by partially 
overcoming two notorious sets of precedents: the Behrami jurisprudence on the attribution of 
conduct of military personnel involved in operations under UN auspices;
7
 and the particularly 
ambiguous Banković jurisprudence on the extraterritorial scope of human rights protection.8 
This article focuses on the Behrami side of Al-Jedda’s story: the question of attribution of 
conduct. Despite the attempts by the ECtHR to pay lip-service to Behrami by distinguishing 
it on the facts, the practical result of Al-Jedda is that Behrami should no longer be considered 
‘good law’ when it comes to attribution of conduct during UN-authorized peace support 
operations. This is a major development, given that Behrami was almost universally criticised 
by legal commentators for being wrong both as a matter of law and as a matter of policy.
9
 
                                                 
4  See http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/20/us-libya-un-idUSTRE77J1SC20110820. The operation was 
authorized by UNSCR 1973(2011); see also UNSCR 2009(2011). The complex human rights situation during the conflict in 
Libya was addressed by Amnesty International (AI), ‘The Battle for Libya: Killings, Disappearances and Torture’, AI-Index 
MDE 19/025/2011, 13 September 2011. 
5  Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom (GC), n. 27021/08, 7 July 2011, 30 BHRC 637 (Al-Jedda (GC) hereinafter). Among 
the first comments appeared on the case, see M. Milanović, ‘European Court Decides Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda’, Blog of the 
European Journal of International Law, 7 July 2011, at http://www.ejiltalk.org/european-court-decides-al-skeini-and-al-
jedda/.   
6  See Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom (Admissibility), n. 61498/08, 30 June 2009, 49 EHRR SE11; 
Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom (Merits) (Fourth Section), n. 61498/08, 2 March 2010, 51 EHRR 9; Al-Skeini 
and others v. United Kingdom (GC), n. 55721/07, 7 July 2011, 53 EHRR 18. 
7  Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway (Admissibility) (GC), nn. 71412/01 and 
78166/01, 2 May 2007, (2007) 45 EHRR SE10 (Behrami hereinafter); see also Dušan Berić and others v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Admissibility), n. 36357/04 and ots., 16 October 2007, (2008) 46 EHRR SE6; Gajic v. Germany 
(Admissibility), n. 31446/02, 28 August 2007, unrep; Kasumaj v. Greece (Admissibility), n. 6974/05, 5 July 2007, unrep; 
Stephens v. Cyprus, Turkey and the United Nations (Admissibility), n. 45267/06, 11 December 2008, unrep; Blagojević v. the 
Netherlands (Admissibility), n. 49032/07, 9 June 2009, unrep; Galić v. the Netherlands (Admissibility), n. 22617/07, 9 June 
2009, unrep.. 
8  Banković and others v. Belgium and 16 other member states (Admissibility) (GC), n. 52207/99, 12 December 
2001, (2002) 41 ILM 517. See also Gentilhomme, Schaff-Benhadji and Zerouki v. France (Merits), nn. 48205/99, 48207/99 
and 48209/99, 14 May 2002; Kalogeropolou and others v. Greece and Germany (Admissibility), n. 59021/00, 12 December 
2002; Öcalan v. Turkey (Merits), n. 46221/99, 12 March 2003, (2003) 37 EHRR 10; Assanidze v. Georgia (Merits) (GC), n. 
71503/01, 8 April 2004, (2004) 39 EHRR 32; Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, n. 12747/87, 26 June 1992, (1992) 
14 EHRR 745; Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova and Russia (Merits) (GC), n. 48787/99, 8 July 2004, (2005) 40 EHRR 46; Issa 
and others v. Turkey (Merits), n. 31821/96, 16 November 2004, (2005) 41 EHRR 27; Marković and others v. Italy (Merits) 
(GC), n. 1398/03, 14 December 2006, (2007) 44 EHRR 52. 
9  See among others C.A. Bell, ‘Reassessing Multiple Attribution: The International Law Commission and the 
Behrami and Saramati Decision’, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. (2010) 501-548; P. Bodeau-Livinec, G.P. Buzzini and S. 
Villalpando, ‘Case note, Behrami & (and) Behrami v. France; Saramati v. France, Germany, & (and) Norway ’, 102 Am. J. 
Int'l L. (2008) 323-331; P. Klein, ‘Responsabilité pour les faits commis dans le cadre d'opérations de paix étendue du 
pouvoir de contrôle de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme: quelques considérations critiques sur l'arrêt Behrami et 
Saramati’, 53 A.F.D.I. (2007) 43-64; B. Knoll, The Legal Status of Territories Subject to Administration by International 
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Before proceeding any further, it is necessary to define ‘attribution of conduct’ and 
‘peace support operations under UN auspices’. The concept of ‘attribution of conduct’ is one 
of the key elements of the law of international responsibility. It determines when acts or 
omissions are deemed to belong to a state or an international organization (IO) for the 
purposes of responsibility. An internationally wrongful act is an act which is both attributable 
to a state or an international organization and which constitutes a breach of an international 
obligation owed by that state or international organization.
10
 Rules on attribution are 
contained in both the 2001 Articles on State Responsibility (ASR) and the 2011 Articles on 
the Responsibility of International Organizations (ARIO). 
The ASR contain eight provisions on attribution of conduct, and courts have generally 
deemed these reflective of customary international law.
11
 Articles 4, 5, 6 and 7 deal with the 
attribution of the on-duty conduct of ‘organs’, ‘persons or entities exercising elements of 
governmental authority’, and ‘organs placed at the disposal of the State by another State’, 
whose acts and omissions are attributed even if ultra vires. These may be called ‘institutional 
links’, because they arise from a continuous ex ante facto link between the state and the 
person carrying out the conduct under consideration. Articles 8 to 11 deal with conduct which 
is prima facie not the conduct of a state organ or of an entity exercising governmental 
authority on a continuous basis. This conduct may be attributed to a state because of a 
‘factual’ link – one that is not continuous, but transient. The most important of these rules is 
Article 8 ASR, which addresses the attribution of conduct of private individuals acting ‘under 
the instruction of, or under the direction or control of’ a state. Factual links can also comprise 
relatively rare situations such as the adoption of the conduct of non-state actors by the state 
(Article 11), the exercise of elements of governmental authority ‘in the absence and in default 
                                                                                                                                                        
Organisations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 367-381; P. Lagrange, ‘Responsabilité des Etats pour actes 
accomplis en application du Chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies’, 112 Revue gén. de droit int. pub. (2008) 85-110; 
K.M. Larsen, ‘Attribution of conduct in peace operations: the “ultimate authority and control” test’, 19 Eur. J. Int'l L. (2008) 
509-531; M. Milanović and T. Papić, ‘As Bad as It Gets: The European Court of Human Rights’s Behrami and Saramati 
Decision and General International Law’, 58 Int. Comp. Law. Q. (2009) 267–296; P. Palchetti, ‘Azioni di forze istituite o 
autorizzate delle Nazioni Unite davanti alla Corte europea dei diritti dell'uomo: i casi Behrami e Saramati’, 90 Riv. Dir. Int. 
(2007) 681-704; A. Sari, ‘Jurisdiction and International Responsibility in Peace Support Operations: the Behrami and 
Saramati cases’, 8 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. (2008) 151-170; L.-A. Sicilianos, ‘L'(ir)responsabilité des forces multinationales?’, in 
L. Boisson de Chazournes and M. Kohen (eds), Liber Amicorum Vera Gowlland-Debbas (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) 
95-125, at 102-106; J. Welch and A. Fairclough, ‘Kosovo: contracting states acting under UN mandate - inadmissibility 
ratione personae’, 12 Eur. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. (2007) 698-703. 
10  Art. 2, International Law Commission, ‘Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’, 
annexed to United Nations General Assembly resolution 56/83, UN Doc. A/RES/56/83, 12 December 2001 (ASR 
hereinafter) and Art. 4 ARIO. See B. Stern, ‘The Elements of an Internationally Wrongful Act’, in J. Crawford, A. Pellet and 
S. Olleson (eds), The Law of International Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 193-220. In order to 
establish responsibility, none of the ‘circumstances precluding wrongfulness’ of Part One, Chapter V ASR (and their ARIO 
equivalent, as to IOs) must apply. 




of the official authorities’ (Article 9) and the conduct of successful insurrectional movements 
(Article 10). This distinction between ‘institutional’ and ‘factual’ links is fundamental. 
Institutional links reflect a permanent relationship between the state and its organs and 
parastatal entities. They define what is the ‘state sector’, as opposed to the ‘non-state 
sector’.12 The spectrum of conduct performed by organs and parastatal entities which is 
attributed to states is consequently broad, because their every on-duty act and omission, even 
if performed ultra vires, is attributable. By contrast, factual links may be described as a link 
between the state and the conduct itself, by reason of (for instance) the instruction, direction 
or control exercised over the actor at the time the conduct was performed. Any on-going 
relationship between the actor and the state is thus irrelevant. This considerably reduces the 




The ARIO are much shorter than the ASR in their consideration of attribution of 
conduct. Articles 6, 7, 8 and 9 deal respectively with the attribution of conduct by organs and 
agents of IOs, the attribution of conduct by organs or agents placed at the disposal of an 
international organization, the attribution of ultra vires conduct of such actors, and the 
adoption of conduct by an international organization. The encompassing concept of the 
‘agent’ of an international organization is meant to cover both ‘institutional’ and ‘factual’ 
links with an IO, in an unfortunate departure from the clear distinction in the ASR. 
The term ‘peace support operations under UN auspices’ encompasses both ‘UN-run’ 
operations and ‘UN-authorized’ operations. ‘UN-run’ operations occur when the Security 
Council mandates the Secretary-General to establish and run a military operation, with or 
without the consent of the local government(s). This is what is usually referred to as ‘UN 
peacekeeping’, an example of which was MONUC in the Democratic Republic of Congo.14 
‘UN-authorized’ operations occur when the Security Council authorizes member states or 
regional organizations to use ‘all necessary means’ (including military force) for the purpose 
of enforcing or maintaining the peace, again irrespective of the consent of the local 
government(s). These operations are often referred to as ‘peace enforcement’ or ‘peace 
                                                 
12  International Law Commission, ‘First report on State responsibility by Mr. James Crawford, Special Rapporteur’, 
A/CN.4/490, Yearbook… 1998, vol. II(1), 1-80, 1998, at 33-34. 
13  International Law Commission, ‘Commentaries to the Articles on State Responsibility’, Yearbook… 2001, vol. II, 
pp. 26-143, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf (ASR Commentaries 
hereinafter), 48. 
14  See generally United Nations, ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines’, (Capstone 
Doctrine), 18 January 2008, available at http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf. On MONUC, see 
UNSCR 1291(2000), 1564(2004), 1797(2008), 1856(2008), and 1925(2010). More robust peacekeeping and enforcement 
operations, such as UNPROFOR mentioned above, have also been run by the United Nations in the past. 
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making’ operations; an example thereof was the NATO-led Kosovo Force (K-FOR).15 To 
determine whether a certain operation is a ‘UN-run’ or ‘UN-authorized’ one, reference must 
be made to ‘who exercises operational command and control over the force. If it is the 
[Security] Council or a UN organ which exercises these powers then it is a UN force. If, 
however, it is a Member State or a regional organization then it is a UN authorized force’.16 
The distinction between UN-run and UN-authorized operations is crucial to issues of 
attribution of conduct. Given the facts in Al-Jedda, I will focus only on UN-authorized 
operations here.  
2. The judicial history of Al-Jedda’s internment 
Hilal Al-Jedda was a dual Iraqi-British national who was arrested in Baghdad in October 
2004 and detained without charge or trial for ‘imperative reasons of security in Iraq’ until 
mid-December 2007.
17
 He was held in British custody in Basra. In early 2005, he started 
proceedings in the High Court to challenge the legality of his detention and obtain a transfer 
to the United Kingdom. He claimed that his detention violated the UK Human Rights Act 
1998 because it was in breach of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR).
18
 This establishes that ‘everyone has the right to liberty and security of person’ and 
that ‘no one shall be deprived of his liberty’ save in some specific cases enumerated in the 
Article and ‘in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law’. The Divisional Court and the 
Court of Appeal both dismissed the claim, albeit for slightly different reasons.
19
 The House of 
Lords upheld the decision by the Court of Appeal and affirmed that, although Al-Jedda’s 
internment could be attributed to the United Kingdom, Article 5 ECHR rights were displaced 
and/or qualified by UN Security Council resolutions authorizing the use of force by the 
Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I).
20
 These resolutions imposed ‘an obligation upon the 
                                                 
15  See UNSCR 1244(1999). 
16  D. Sarooshi, The United Nations and the development of collective security: the delegation by the UN Security 
Council of its Chapter VII powers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 163. See also C. Gray, International Law and the Use of 
Force (3rd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 254-428. 
17 Al-Jedda (GC), [9-15]. The formula ‘imperative reasons of security’ is employed in the letter annexed to UNSCR 
1546(2004), which in turn uses the language of Art. 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, 75 UNTS 287. Al-Jedda was 
released without charge (and without apparent reason) a few days after the House of Lords dismissed his appeal. He was also 
deprived of his UK citizenship on the basis that doing so was ‘conducive to the public good’: Al-Jedda (GC), [14]. 
18  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 UNTS 222. 
19  R. (Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence, 12 August 2005, [2005] EWHC 1809 (Admin) and R. (Al-Jedda) v. 
Secretary of State for Defence, [2006] EWCA Civ 327, 29 March 2006, [2007] QB 621. 
20  R. (Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence, [2007] UKHL 58, 12 December 2007, [2008] 1 AC 332 (Al-Jedda 
(HL) hereinafter). See also Larsen, above n. 9; A. Orakhelashvili, ‘R (on the Application of Al-Jedda) (FC) v. Secretary of 
State for Defence’, 102 Am. J. Int'l L. (2008) 337-345; C. Tomuschat, ‘R (on the Application of Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of 
State for Defence - Human Rights in a Multi-Level System of Governance and the Internment of Suspected Terrorists’, 9 
Melb. J. Int'l L. (2008) 391-404. The House of Lords judgment was analysed by the present author in F. Messineo, ‘The 
House of Lords in Al-Jedda and Public International Law: Attribution of Conduct to UN-authorized Forces and the Power of 
the Security Council to Displace Human Rights’, 56 Neth. Int'l L. Rev. (2009) 35-62. 
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United Kingdom to carry out’ the internment.21 Were it not for such obligation, the 
internment would plainly have violated Article 5 ECHR.
22
 
The ECtHR’s Grand Chamber was seized of essentially the same matter in Al-Jedda v. 
United Kingdom. The ECtHR agreed with the House of Lords in attributing Al-Jedda’s 
internment to the United Kingdom, but reached a different conclusion as to Article 5 ECHR. 
Relevant Security Council resolutions neither qualified, nor displaced Article 5 ECHR, and 
therefore the UK had breached Al-Jedda’s Article 5 rights.23 The ECtHR ordered the UK to 
pay Al-Jedda a monetary compensation of € 25,000, but determined that only part of the legal 
costs incurred by the applicant would be reimbursed.
24
 In this article we are not dealing with 
the international obligations owed by the UK under Article 5 ECHR, nor with the question of 
the potential conflict between Article 5 ECHR and Security Council resolutions authorizing 
internment.
25
 Instead, our focus here is on whether the detention of Al-Jedda should be 
attributed to the United Kingdom (as was held implicitly by lower domestic courts and 
explicitly by the House of Lords and the ECtHR) or whether it could be attributed exclusively 
to the United Nations because of the Security Council authorization to use force in Iraq (as 
the British Government argued before the House of Lords and the ECtHR). Much of this 
discussion turned on the applicability to this case of the Behrami admissibility decision, 
which had been rendered by the ECtHR in May 2007.
26
 It is to this that I will now turn. 
3. Saramati’s detention and Sarooshi’s theory of delegation  
The Behrami and Saramati admissibility decision was among the most controversial 
judgments adopted by the European Court in recent years.
27
 The events leading to the 
separate applications of Behrami and Saramati had occurred in Kosovo. An undetonated 
NATO bomb had killed and injured Behrami’s two sons in 2000, and the applicant deemed 
                                                 
21  Al-Jedda (HL), [135] per Lord Carswell; see also [32-39] per Lord Bingham. 
22  Al-Jedda (HL), [27] per Lord Bingham: the internment would not fall under any of the exceptions provided in 
points a) to f) of Art. 5(1) ECHR. 
23  Al-Jedda (GC), [97-110]. 
24  Al-Jedda (GC), [112-117]. By awarding only € 40,000 for legal expenses out of the requested £ 85,946.32 GBP, 
and even factoring in the compensation of € 25,000, the judgment would effectively leave Al-Jedda out of pocket by about € 
30,000 should his legal counsels indeed charge him the full amount requested; this is in addition to previous legal costs at 
domestic level. The message from the Court seems to be that suspected terrorists should choose cheaper counsels when their 
human rights are violated. 
25  I have elsewhere discussed my views on this potential norm conflict with reference to the decision by the House of 
Lords:  Messineo, above n. 20, 47-61. I stand by those comments mutatis mutandis notwithstanding the cunning (and 
progressive) solution adopted by the ECtHR, which chose to pretend that no norm conflict existed in order to ‘save’ both the 
full application of Art. 5 ECHR and the theoretical supremacy of the UN Charter under Art. 103 UNC. See Al-Jedda (GC), 
[97-110] and the important dissenting opinion by Judge Poalelungi. 
26  Above n. 7. 
27  Aside from most of the commentators mentioned above at n. 9, both the International Law Commission and the 
UN Secretariat authoritatively criticised Behrami: see International Law Commission, ‘Commentaries on the Draft Articles 
on the Responsibility of International Organizations Adopted on First Reading’, Report of the International Law 
Commission to the General Assembly, A/64/10, 39-178 (DARIO Commentaries hereinafter), at 67. 
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French K-FOR troops responsible for the lack of de-mining in the area.
28
 Saramati had been 
imprisoned from 2001 to 2002 by the order of French and Norwegian K-FOR officials – his 
situation in this respect being quite similar to that of Al-Jedda.
29
 The Grand Chamber of the 
Court jointly declared the two applications inadmissible. The ECtHR decided that it had no 
jurisdiction ratione personae because K-FOR’s conduct should be attributed exclusively to 
the United Nations by virtue of the ‘ultimate authority and control’ of the Security Council 
over the operation.
30
 The fact that ‘effective command of the relevant operational matters was 
retained by NATO’ was irrelevant to attribution, according to the ECtHR, because such 




This language of delegation employed by the ECtHR in Behrami had a specific 
origin.
32
 In an influential book published in 1999, Dan Sarooshi expressed the view that the 
distinction between UN-run (peacekeeping) operations and UN-authorized (peace 
enforcement) missions was irrelevant to questions of attribution of conduct. In both 
UN-authorized and UN-run operations, he argued, ‘the question of who exercises operational 
command and control over the force is immaterial to the question of responsibility. The more 
important enquiry is who exercises overall authority and control over the forces’.33 In 
particular, whenever the Security Council authorized member states to use force, the ‘acts’ of 
these forces were ‘attributable to the UN, since the forces are acting under UN authority’.34 
The only two exceptions to this principle were cases where the Council was ‘prevented from 
exercising overall authority and control over the force’, or when the forces acted beyond the 
‘delegated mandate and authority’ they received.35 In Sarooshi’s view, whenever the Security 
Council established peacekeeping forces or authorized the use of force by member states, the 
Council was delegating some of its powers, respectively to the Secretary-General and to those 
member states.
36
 The premise of his argument on attribution was that the Security Council 
could only delegate some powers (those it had, but not those it had itself been delegated to 
                                                 
28  Behrami, [61]. 
29  ibid., [5-7; 8-17]. 
30  ibid., [140].  
31  ibid., [140].  
32  See  Larsen, above n. 9, 521. See also Milanović and Papić, above n. 9. 
33  Sarooshi, above n. 16, 163. 
34  ibid., 165. 
35  ibid., 165. 





 from this, it followed that the Council must retain a degree of control over the 
forces and remain actively involved throughout.
38
 
Sarooshi’s construction is problematic, for reasons which cannot fully be addressed 
here. Suffice it to say, first, that this view substitutes an ‘is’ for an ‘ought’: it essentially 
implies that attribution must be to the UN because the UN Security Council is (allegedly) 
under an obligation to retain an overall control over them. But such control may well be 
lacking as a matter of fact. Second, the theoretical framework of delegation is not 
unanimously accepted. While many recognize it as a very important original contribution to 
the conceptualization of Security Council action,
39
 the theory of ‘delegation’ is slightly 
divorced from practice – more ‘de lege ferenda’ than ‘lex lata’, as Kirgis put it.40 In fact, the 
distinction between UN-run and UN-authorized operations for the purposes of attribution is 
grounded on over sixty years of UN practice to that effect.
41
 
Aside from the doctrinal value of Sarooshi’s theory, what is surprising is that the 
ECtHR implicitly adopted it as the lex lata without any explanation. The Court reaffirmed 
this adoption of the delegation theory in various other cases after Behrami. The most 
interesting of these is the Dušan Berić case,42 where the very complex question of the 
attribution of the conduct of the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina (an 
institution belonging to the Bosnian constitutional framework arising from the Dayton 
Agreements) was discussed in terms of the ‘delegation’ of power from the Security Council.43 
The Court offered no plausible reason as to why it adopted the delegation framework, nor 
why such adoption would lead to the criterion of ‘ultimate authority and control’ being 
applied to the question of attribution of conduct.
44
 The Court switched from Sarooshi’s 
                                                 
37  ibid., 20-45 (Sarooshi based this assertion on the doctrine, common to some domestic legal systems, that delegatus 
non potest delegare; but the transmigration of this doctrine to international law is not uncontroversial). 
38  ibid., 163-164. 
39  See e.g. the Foreword to the book by Rosalyn Higgins: ibid., xi-xii. 
40  F.L. Kirgis, ‘Book Review of David Malone, Decision-Making in the UN Security Council: The Case of Haiti, 
1990-1997 and Danesh Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security’, 93 Am. J. Int'l L. (1999) 
970-975, at 975. 
41  The UN Secretariat expressed this view forcefully before the International Law Commission: A/CN.4/637/Add.1 
(2011), esp. at 10. 
42  See above n. 7. 
43  Berić case, above n. 7, [27]. Berić was one of the 26 politicians who were removed from office in the Republika 
Srpska by the High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 2004 and 2005 because of their lack of cooperation with 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Berić and the other applicants claimed that their removal 
from office violated Bosnia’s human rights obligations, in particular Art. 6, Art. 11 and Art. 13 ECHR. The ECtHR declared 
their applications inadmissible because in its view the acts of the High Representative could not be attributed to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, but should be attributed to the United Nations. 
44  The ECtHR referred to two other authorities in Berić, but neither of them supports its conclusions. These are: B.-
O. Bryde and A. Reinisch, ‘Article 48’, in B. Simma (ed) The Charter of the United Nations: a commentary, vol. 1, (2nd ed., 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 775-780; C. Stahn, ‘International Territorial Administration in the former 
Yugoslavia: Origins, Developments and Challenges ahead’, 61 ZaöRV (2001) 107-176. 
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‘overall authority and control’ test to an ‘ultimate authority and control’ test in Behrami, 
which was then transformed again into an ‘effective overall control’ test in Berić.45 
4. Lord Bingham’s distinction vs. Lord Rodger’s dissent 
A few months after Behrami, the House of Lords reached the conclusion that Al-Jedda’s 
internment should be attributed to the United Kingdom, even if Saramati’s detention had been 
deemed attributable exclusively to the UN by the ECtHR. However, possibly out of deference 
to the European Court, their Lordships stopped short of declaring that the ECtHR test of 
‘ultimate authority and control’ was wrong and instead set out to distinguish Behrami and 
Saramati on their facts. I have discussed elsewhere the lack of a clear common rationale for 
such a distinction, as well as  the intrinsic weakness of the arguments advanced by the 
majority of the House of Lords in this regard.
46
 I will briefly summarize that debate here 
because it at the heart of what the ECtHR decided in July 2011. 
The late Lord Bingham delivered the leading judgment in Al-Jedda v UK. When 
distinguishing the situation before him and that in Saramati, he was of the view that the 
detention of these two individuals, Saramati’s by K-FOR and Al-Jedda’s by MNF-I, were not 
analogous. Coalition forces had not been sent to Iraq by the UN, nor had the Coalition 
Provisional Authority been set up by the Security Council.
47
 The forces obviously had no UN 
mandate when they began their military occupation, which formally lasted until the handing 
over of power to the Iraqi interim Government on 28 June 2004.
48
 In his view, the relevant 
Security Council resolutions could not be interpreted as a delegation of power, but as an 
authorization to the UK to carry out functions that the Security Council could not perform 
itself.
49
 Furthermore, it could not ‘realistically be said that US and UK forces were under the 
effective command and control of the UN, or that UK forces were under such command and 
control when they detained the appellant’.50 Such test of ‘effective command and control’ 
                                                 
45  Such a test may at first glance appear similar to that in Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits) (GC), n. 15318/89, (1997) 23 
EHRR 513, but in Loizidou the Court employed the term ‘effective overall control’ when addressing a question relating to 
the extra-territorial scope of ECHR obligations under Art. 1, not a question of attribution of conduct (the Court solved the 
attribution question there by casting Northern Cyprus authorities as an administrative subdivision of Turkey, i.e. an organ 
thereof): compare M. Milanović, ‘From Compromise to Principle: Clarifying the Concept of State Jurisdiction in Human 
Rights Treaties’, 8 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. (2008) 411-448, at 436-446 with K.M. Larsen, ‘Attribution of conduct in peace 
operations: the “ultimate authority and control” test’, 19 Eur. J. Int'l L. (2008) 509-531, at 518-520. 
46  Messineo, above n. 20, 43-47. 
47  Al-Jedda (HL), [23]. 
48  Ibid., [16] and [23]. 
49  Ibid.. 
50  Ibid., [23]. 
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On the other hand, the late Lord Rodger was of the opinion that the legal situation of 
Saramati’s detention by K-FOR and Al-Jedda’s detention by the MNF-I was similar. First, 
the comparison had to be made with reference to the time of the detention, not earlier, so that 
the difference in how the two operations were established was irrelevant.
52
 Second, the MNF-
I became a UN-authorized operation (just like KFOR) when it received a mandate from the 
Security Council.
53
 Third, the UN had no more ‘effective control’ over Saramati’s detention 
than they had over Al-Jedda’s detention.54 Fourth, the authorization to ‘take all necessary 
measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq’ in UNSCR 1546 
was ‘essentially similar to the authorisation given to K-FOR in Resolution 1244’.55 
5. The problematic distinguishing of Behrami by the ECtHR 
Unsurprisingly, the UK Government and Al-Jedda’s counsel referred extensively to the 
debate between Lord Bingham and Lord Rodger when the case was heard before the ECtHR. 
The UK Government relied heavily on Lord Rodger’s opinion and argued that Lord Bingham 
had ‘failed to give proper effect to’ Behrami.56 The mandate of both K-FOR and MNF-I was 
approved by the Security Council under Chapter VII, and in both cases there had been a 
delegation of power in the sense discussed above.
57
 The UK had not ‘detached’ itself ‘from 
the Security Council mandate’.58 Furthermore, from June 2006 onwards it had been Iraqi and 
US authorities, not UK authorities, that had ‘authorised’ Al-Jedda’s internment by British 
forces.
59
 The Government also argued that there were important reasons that militated against 
the application of the ECHR ‘in the context of the multinational force’s multinational and 
unified command structure’ where some participating states were not parties to the ECHR. 
                                                 
51  Ibid., [5]. The test was also mentioned (but then ignored) in Behrami, [30]. This reliance by Lord Bingham on 
‘effective command and control’ rather than Behrami’s ‘ultimate authority and control’ may be taken as an implicit sign that 
their Lordships were not paying much more than lip-service to Behrami after all. But the fact remains that they formally 
decided to distinguish it on the facts. Another possible route of distinguishing would have been that regarding Behrami as 
only applying to cases of UN territorial administration (such as UNMIK): the decision has recently been so interpreted by A. 
Sari, ‘Autonomy, Attribution and Accountability: Reflections on the Behrami Case’, in R. Collins and N. D. White, 
International organisations and the idea of autonomy (London: Routledge, 2011), 257-277. This construction, however, 
seems to discount that Sarooshi’s theory (on which Behrami is based) is premised on the idea that there is no difference 
between UN-run and UN-authorized operations when it comes to attribution of conduct.  
52  Al-Jedda (HL), [61]. 
53  Ibid., [63]. 
54  Ibid., [65]. 
55  Ibid., [77]. See UNSCR 1244(1999); UNSCR 1546(2004).  
56  Al-Jedda (GC), [64]. 
57  Ibid., [65-66]. 
58  Ibid., [67]. 
59  Ibid.. 
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Apart from the ‘real uncertainty’ of the resulting responsibilities, there could be a risk of 
‘deterring contracting parties from contributing troops’ in the future.60 
Al-Jedda’s counsel argued that the House of Lords was right in its distinguishing of 
Behrami.
61
 First, the ‘invasion of Iraq … was not a United Nations operation’, whereas K-
FOR had a clear humanitarian scope.
62
 Second, there was no delegation of power to the 
MNF-I, but ‘a simple authorization’ by the Security Council, while the ‘unified command 
over the multinational force was, as it had always been, under the control and authority of the 
United States and the United Kingdom’.63 Third, the United Nations Secretariat was clearly 
of the opinion that the MNF-I was not ‘under United Nations authority and control’.64 
Crucially, Al-Jedda’s counsel also argued that ‘multiple and concurrent attribution was 
possible in respect of conduct deriving from the activity of an international organization 
and/or one or more States’, and that the policy arguments advanced by the British 
Government were to be viewed with some ‘scepticism’ given that issues of attribution were 




The European Court agreed with Al-Jedda’s counsels and explicitly concurred with the 
majority of the House of Lords – in particular the Court approved Lord Bingham’s 
distinguishing of Behrami.
66
 The adoption of UNSCR 1511(2003) and 1546(2004) had not 
altered the unified command structure of the Multinational Force, which had remained 
substantially the same since the invasion in March 2003; nor had the UN assumed ‘any 
degree of control’ over MNF-I.67 Indeed, other UN organs, such as the UN peacekeeping 
mission (UNAMI) and the Secretary-General, had ‘repeatedly protested about the extent to 
which security internment was being used by the Multi-National Force’, a clear sign, in the 
Court’s view, that the UN was not in charge.68 The situation in Kosovo was different, because 
of the language employed in UNSCR 1244(1999) and of the different role of the UN there.
69
 
Whether adopting the ‘effective control’ test arising from the Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of International Organizations or the ‘ultimate authority and control’ test of 
                                                 
60  Ibid., [68]. 
61  Ibid., [70]. 
62  Ibid., [71]. 
63  Ibid., [72]. 
64  Ibid.. 
65  Ibid., [69]. 
66  Ibid., [83-86]. 
67  Ibid., [80]; see also [81]. 
68  Ibid., [82]. 
69  Ibid., [83]. 
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Behrami, the result would be the same: Al-Jedda’s detention was ‘not … attributable to the 
United Nations’,70 but to the United Kingdom. 
While it is correct that Al-Jedda’s detention was certainly not attributable to the UN, 
this distinguishing of Saramati’s detention from Al-Jedda’s detention is problematic. The 
arguments put forward by Lord Rodger in the House of Lords are still valid mutatis mutandis 
with respect to the ECtHR judgment. Two elements are worth emphasizing here. First, the 
European Court failed to give proper consideration to the crucial role of UNSCR 1511(2003). 
The ECtHR maintained that the command structure of the coalition did not change after the 
invasion. This may be generally true, as evidenced for example by the fact that the UK and 
the US components of the mission kept the same names, ‘Telic’ and ‘Iraqi Freedom’ 
respectively. But some significant changes did occur in the composition of the force after 
May 2003. Many other countries joined the UK, the US, Australia and Poland (the four 
original invading countries).
71
 Whatever the (lack of) legal authority for the invasion of Iraq 
of March 2003, the adoption of UNSCR 1511 in October 2003 established this ‘new’ 
international coalition as a UN-authorized mission.
72
 Despite some degree of operational 
continuity, this was a different legal entity from the coalition that invaded Iraq. 
Second, K-FOR was somewhat analogous to the MNF-I even as to the circumstances of 
its creation. It is true that K-FOR started as an operation only after UNSCR 1244 of 10 June 
1999, but NATO, which ran K-FOR, had been bombing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
between 24 March 1999 and 10 June 1999 without any Security Council authorization to do 
so. Both in Kosovo and in Iraq, a highly controversial use of force by some states was 
followed by a resolution by the UN Security Council asking those same states and their allies 
to deal with the aftermath of the conflict they had started. Legally, Saramati’s detention by K-
FOR and Al-Jedda’s internment by the MNF-I were wholly analogous in this respect too. 
In sum, Lord Rodger was right that distinguishing Behrami on the facts was legally 
impossible. Quite simply – and Lord Rodger possibly would not have shared this view – 
Behrami was wrongly decided. Neither the conduct of K-FOR, nor that of MNF-I could ever 
be attributed to the United Nations – and that is why the UN was in a position to criticise both 
the MNF-I and K-FOR for the (different) procedure under which they carried out 
                                                 
70  Ibid., [84]. 
71  For instance, Italy and other European countries only joined the coalition after UNSCR 1483(2003) recognized the 
role of occupying powers and of the Coalition Provisional Authority. See S. Giordano, ‘Operazione “Antica Babilonia”: 
primi ammaestramenti’, InfoDifesa, 1/2007, available at http://www.difesa.it/Pubblicistica/info-
difesa/Infodifesa140/Documents/Operazione_Antica_Babilon_429ammaestramenti.pdf, 12-19. 





 Consistent UN and state practice over the last 60 years firmly distinguishes 
between UN-run operations (such as peacekeeping) and authorizations to use force granted 
by the Security Council to member states (such as K-FOR and MNF-I).
74
 While questions 
may arise as to the attribution to the United Nations of the conduct of troops contributed by 
member states to UN-run operations, the conduct of UN-authorized troops is generally not 
attributable to the UN. This is because the UN has usually no form of control over them, as 
both the House of Lords and the ECtHR in Al-Jedda recognized.
75
 The authorization by the 
Security Council has the unique purpose of rendering legal an act of member states which 
would otherwise be illegal under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The duty to report to the 
Security Council from time to time perhaps creates a situation of political endorsement, but 
not one of ownership on the part of the UN.
76
 In other words, neither Article 6 ARIO, nor 
Article 7 ARIO are applicable to UN-authorized missions: the conduct of member states 
carrying out these operations is not the conduct of ‘organs or agents’ of the United Nations, 
nor is it the conduct of ‘state organs’ which are ‘put at the disposal’ of the United Nations. 
The idea that the conduct could be described as such would potentially lead to absurd 
consequences, which were hinted at by Lord Bingham when he said that it had not, to his 
knowledge, ever been suggested ‘that the treatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib was 
attributable to the UN rather than the US’.77 Indeed, as Baroness Hale remarked, it would be 
‘unlikely in the extreme that the United Nations would accept that the acts of the MNF were 
in any way attributable to the UN’.78 The reason for this is not to be found in the degree of 
control of the UN over the MNF, for there was never any question that such control existed. 
There is a more radical reason: that the jailers of Al-Jedda were at all times UK organs under 
the definition of Article 4 ASR.
79
 
                                                 
73  The ECtHR referred to UN’s criticism of MNF-I in Al-Jedda (GC), [82], but failed to notice that the UN Human 
Rights Committee expressed similar concerns regarding K-FOR at CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1 (2006), [17]. 
74  Above, n. 41 and A/51/389 (1996), [17]. See also e.g. F. Seyersted, United Nations forces in the law of peace and 
war (Leyden: A.W. Sĳthoff, 1966), 110-112. But see N.D. White and S. MacLeod, ‘EU Operations and Private Military 
Contractors: Issues of Corporate and Institutional Responsibility’, 19 Eur. J. Int'l L. (2008) 965-988, at 974 (in their opinion 
the positive legacy of Behrami was precisely the overcoming of such a distinction between UN-run and UN-authorized 
missions for the purposes of responsibility). 
75  See A/CN.4/637/Add.1 (2011), 12 (‘[T]he responsibility of the United Nations cannot be entailed by acts or 
omissions of those not subject to its command and control. Since the early days of peacekeeping operations the United 
Nations has recognized its responsibility and liability in compensation for acts or omissions of members of its peacekeeping 
operations, and by the same token, it has refused to entertain claims against other military operations — notwithstanding the 
fact that they were authorized by the Security Council. This practice has been uniform, consistent and without exception’). 
76  See Al-Jedda (HL), [24] (‘It is quite true that duties to report were imposed in Iraq as in Kosovo. But … it is one 
thing to receive reports, another to exercise effective command and control’). 
77  ibid., [23]. 
78  ibid., [124]. 
79  See also Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. UK (Admissibility), above n. 6, esp. at [84-89] (the case was decided by the 
ECtHR under the assumption that the conduct of UK troops in Iraq was attributable to the UK, notwithstanding Behrami). 
Furthermore, in the Al-Skeini case, which involved the death of 6 civilians during the Iraqi conflict of 2003, the UK 
Government had not advanced the attribution question before UK courts (because Behrami had not been decided yet), but it 
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6. Was Behrami in fact ‘overruled’? Dual attribution and ‘effective control’ 
While Lord Bingham’s distinguishing of Behrami may perhaps be explained as a form of 
judicial deference towards the ECtHR,
80
 the European Court was in a much better position to 
set aside its own Behrami decision. From a purely textual perspective, it may seem that it 
chose not to do so: the explicit reference to Behrami and the adoption of Lord Bingham’s 
unpersuasive factual distinction seem directed precisely at confirming that Behrami is still 
‘good law’. But there is more. The Strasbourg court is not a common law court and courts 
without stare decisis have no particular duty to make it explicit when they ‘overrule’ a 
previous decision. Formally, ECtHR decisions are binding only on the parties of each case,
81
 
and although the Grand Chamber was established with the explicit aim of resolving cases in 
which ‘a question before [a] Chamber might have a result inconsistent with a judgment 
previously delivered by the Court’,82 the Court as a whole is under no obligation to be 
consistent with its own precedents – although it can arguably be expected to explain why it 
chooses to depart from them. In this sense, Behrami was not ‘overruled’ because, despite the 
efforts of commentators and judges, it is difficult to read the ECtHR case law as a coherent 
system of mutually consistent judgments: the ECtHR could well decide again in conformity 
with Behrami next time it is faced with a question involving UN operations. But it is 
important to recognize that, despite the attempts of the ECtHR to distinguish Behrami on the 
facts, Al-Jedda cannot be meaningfully reconciled with Behrami. This irreconcilability – 
which in a common law court would be an implicit overruling – is quite striking. 
The first crucial development is that in Al-Jedda the Court recognized the possibility 
that a certain conduct may be attributed both to the UN and to member states contributing 
troops to an operation authorized by the UN. One of the major criticisms of Behrami was 
precisely that it did not recognize such a possibility and answered the attribution question as 
one of ‘either/or’.83 In Al-Jedda the ECtHR said: 
The Court does not consider that, as a result of the authorisation contained in Resolution 
1511, the acts of soldiers within the Multi-National Force became attributable to the United 




                                                                                                                                                        
raised it before the ECtHR and contended that, after the institution of the MNF in Iraq, all its acts would be attributable to 
the UN. The Court held that the UK Government was ‘estopped from raising this objection’ at the time of the proceedings, 
since it had not relied on this argument before national courts: Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom (GC), above n. 6, [97-100]. 
80  Such deference is due under British constitutional law because of the prevailing interpretation of the words ‘take 
into account’ in § 2(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998, which is (perhaps wrongly) seen as restricting the ability of British 
courts to depart from the ECtHR’s views on how to interpret ECHR rights: see Messineo, above n. 20, 46-47. 
81  Art. 46 ECHR. 
82  Art. 30 ECHR. 
83  See Messineo, above n. 20, 40-41; Sari, above n. 9, 159. 
84  Al-Jedda (GC), [80] (emphasis added). 
15 
 
In other words, the possibility remained that the acts of soldiers could be attributed to more 
than one subject at a time (although this was not the case in Al-Jedda, because no UN 
attribution could be established, according to the Court). 
Such a principle of dual or multiple attribution has long been endorsed by the 
International Law Commission. Both the Articles on State Responsibility and the Articles on 
the Responsibility of International Organizations recognize the possibility of multiple 
attribution.
85
 This is because states may indeed act jointly, and so may international 
organizations, or states and international organizations. In fact, such ‘co-authorship’ of 
internationally wrongful acts is only one of the many potential situations of ‘multiple 
responsibility’.86 ‘Co-authorship’ may arise in various situations, such as ‘joint action’ (i.e. a 
‘joint conduct, carried out by a single action’) or ‘action through a joint organ’.87 
International law has no difficulty with the fact that the same conduct can at the same time be 
seen as the act of an individual and that of a collective entity, this ‘duality of responsibility’ 
being a ‘constant feature of international law’.88 Likewise, a given conduct may well ‘belong’ 
to more than one collective entity at once. This can be explained in terms of layers of 
responsibility, or of spheres of influence, or even by analogy with quantum physics.
89
 Quite 
simply, the point is that the answer to the ‘whodunit’ question in international law often 
yields two or three results at once: someone can be wrongfully detained by an individual, two 
states and an International Organization all at the same time.
90
 It is worth re-emphasising, 
however, that this was not the case of Al-Jedda: he was not detained by the UN in any 
meaningful sense. Nonetheless, pace Behrami, the Court finally acknowledged that such dual 
attribution is possible. It also correctly construed what is now Article 7 ARIO as an important 
exception to such cases of dual attribution. According to this provision, where state or IO 
organs are genuinely ‘put at the disposal’ of the United Nations, and the sending state or IO 
no longer exercises control over them, attribution may also be transferred: 
                                                 
85  See Art. 47(1) ASR and Art. 48(1) ARIO. 
86  See e.g. Articles 16, 17, 18 ASR and 17, 18, 61 and 62 ARIO (which are all cases of ‘indirect responsibility’), or 
the Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania) (Merits), 9 April 1949, ICJ Rep. 1949, 4 (a situation where separate 
acts determined a single injury). On issues of multiple responsibility, see A. Nollkaemper, ‘Issues of Shared Responsibility 
before the International Court of Justice’, SHARES Working Paper 1/2011, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam Center for 
International Law), April 2011, available at http://www.sharesproject.nl/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Nollkaemper-Shared-
Resonsibility-before-the-ICJ-2011.pdf. 
87  C. Dominicé, ‘Attribution of Conduct to Multiple States and the Implication of a State in the Act of Another 
State’, in Crawford, Pellet and Olleson (eds), The Law of International Responsibility 281-290, at 282-283. 
88  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment), 26 February 2007, ICJ Rep. 2007, [173]. See Chapter 2, § 1.A. 
89  See A. Clapham, ‘The Subject of Subjects and the Attribution of Attribution’, in L. Boisson de Chazournes and M. 
Kohen (eds), Liber Amicorum Vera Gowlland-Debbas (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) 45-58, at 57-58 (where reference is 
made to Bohr’s theory of complementarity regarding the wave-particle duality). 
90  See also ASR Commentaries, 124 and DARIO Commentaries, 56. 
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The conduct of an organ of a State or an organ or agent of an international organization that 
is placed at the disposal of another international organization shall be considered under 
international law an act of the latter organization if the organization exercises effective 
control over that conduct. 
In order for this rule to apply, the IO must exercise ‘factual control … over the specific 
conduct taken by the organ or agent placed at the receiving organization’s disposal’.91 
Reasons of space do not permit me to offer here a full analysis of the text of Article 7 ARIO 
and its perhaps unfortunate choice of words.
92
 Nonetheless, the ‘effective control’ test is quite 
different from ‘ultimate authority and control’ in Behrami. The European Court in Al-Jedda 
cleverly stopped short of explaining which test it was actually applying to decide on 
attribution and mentioned both the thresholds of ‘effective control’ and ‘ultimate authority 
and control’ as not having been met: 
[T]he Court considers that the United Nations Security Council had neither effective control 
nor ultimate authority and control over the acts and omissions of troops within the 
Multi-National Force and that the applicant’s detention was not, therefore, attributable to the 
United Nations’.93 
This can be read either as an attempt to keep Behrami alive or as a subtle overcoming of that 
decision. Only time will tell if this was in fact an ‘overruling’ of Behrami. 
In sum, both the House of Lords and the European Court of Human Rights correctly 
held that Al-Jedda’s internment was attributable to the United Kingdom. However, their line 
of reasoning was understandably skewed by the notorious Behrami precedent, to the effect 
that what had been obvious throughout the earlier domestic stages of the case became an 
overly complex issue. British troops detaining Al-Jedda in a British detention facility in Iraq 
were British state organs under Article 4 ASR potentially engaging the responsibility of the 
United Kingdom under international law. 
 
 
                                                 
91  DARIO Commentaries, 63. 
92  It seems that the intention of the International Law Commission was that of creating a rule analogous to Art. 6 
ASR (see DARIO Commentaries, 63-64), in which case ‘effective control’ is a misleading term for its similarity to Art. 8 
ASR (especially as interpreted in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment), 26 February 2007, ICJ Rep. 2007, 43). 
93  Al-Jedda (GC), [84]. 
